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Abstract
An important concept for intelligent agent sys-
tems is goals. Goals have two aspects: declara-
tive (a description of the state sought), and pro-
cedural (a set of plans for achieving the goal). A
declarative view of goals is necessary in order to
reason about important properties of goals, while
a procedural view of goals is necessary to ensure
that goals can be achieved efficiently in dynamic
environments. In this paper we propose a frame-
work for goals which integrates both views. We
discuss the requisite properties of goals and the
link between the declarative and procedural as-
pects, then derive a formal semantics which has
these properties. We present a high-level plan no-
tation with goals and give its formal semantics.
We then show how the use of declarative infor-
mation permits reasoning (such as the detection
and resolution of conflicts) to be performed on
goals.
1 Introduction
Intelligent agents are an important technology. Based on
foundational work in AI and Philosophy, agent technol-
ogy has significant applications in a wide range of domains
(Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998) and are considered by
some to be a natural successor to object oriented program-
ming (Jennings, 2001). Although there has been much
debate on what constitutes an agent, and which features
are important, the consensus is that an intelligent agent
is situated, autonomous, reactive, pro-active, and social
(Wooldridge, 1998).
A clearly central concept for pro-active agents is that of
goals (Winikoff et al., 2001). Goals have two aspects:
declarative, where a goal is a description s of the state
of the world which is sought (Env j= s); and procedural,
where a goal is a set of procedures P which are executed (in
an attempt) to achieve the goal1. Although the declarative
aspect is perhaps more natural, the procedural is important
for realisable agents: an important property of goals is that
the agent have the capability of bringing about the goal, for
example having the goal to make it stop raining isn’t sensi-
ble, since (presumably) the weather isn’t under the control
of the agent (Padgham and Lambrix, 2000). Providing ex-
plicitly a procedural aspect which specifies how the agent
might bring about the desired goal is one way of ensuring
that the agent doesn’t adopt goals which it has no way of
bringing about.
Intelligent agent implementation platforms (such as PRS
(Ingrand et al., 1992), dMARS (d’Inverno et al., 1998),
JAM (Huber, 1999), JACK (Busetta et al., 1998), 3APL
(Hindriks et al., 1999), and ConGOLOG (Giacomo et al.,
2000)) are intended for deployment in highly dynamic en-
vironments and as a result adopt the procedural view of
goals in order to avoid lengthy deliberation. For example,
systems in the BDI (Belief Desire Intention) family treat
goals as events which trigger plans, and 3APL defines a
goal as being simply a procedure.
The use of the procedural aspect of goals is crucial to
the practicality of these systems in highly dynamic envi-
ronments. However, by omitting the declarative aspect
of goals the ability to reason about goals is lost. With-
out knowing what a goal is trying to achieve, one cannot
check whether the goal has been achieved, check whether
the goal is impossible, or check for interference between
goals (Thangarajah et al., 2002a). This lack of intelligence
also constitutes a gap between BDI theories and implemen-
tations: an ideal BDI agent is required to drop goals when
they are either achieved, or become unachievable (Rao and
Georgeff, 1992). This cannot be done without declara-
tive information. Further, declarative information allows
the correct realisation of commitments to goals in BDI sys-
tems by decoupling plan failure from goal failure. A goal
1There is often more than one means of achieving a goal.
should not be dropped merely because a plan to achieve
it has failed. Declarative information can specify a condi-
tion for dropping the goal which is independent from plan
failure. By controlling our selection of goal discharge con-
dition we can realise different commitment strategies.
We seek to develop a representation of goals which allows
for both declarative and procedural aspects to be specified
and used. Our aim is to allow agent implementation plat-
forms to be more faithful to their theoretical foundations,
and to provide better handling of goals. In doing this, it is
important that the execution semantics for goals is consis-
tent with the desired properties of (declarative) goals. For
example, given a goal to achieve condition s using a set of
procedures (or recipes or plans) P, if s holds, then P should
not be executed.
We now present a simple example which illustrates the use
of goals and the importance of the properties discussed.
Consider a hungry cat. The cat knows there is food on the
table and formulates a plan to jump on a chair, and then
jump from the chair to the table (left diagram below). The
cat leaps on to the chair successfully. At this point, a nearby
human moves the chair so that the cat can no longer leap to
the table. The cat (being an intelligent agent2) realises this,
and revises its plans: the new plan is to leap from the chair
to a shelf, then walk along the shelf, and finally leap from
the shelf down to the table (right diagram below). However,
fortune smiles upon the feline: after leaping up to the shelf
it finds that food has been left on the shelf. The opportunis-
tic cat abandons its plan to continue to the table and eats
upon the shelf instead. This scenario illustrates the impor-
tance of retrying upon the failure of a plan, and of detecting
when a goal (reaching food) is fortuitously achieved and
dropping the goal and the associated plan. Another impor-
tant property is that goals are not dropped when an associ-
ated plan succeeds, unless the goal’s condition is met. For
example, suppose the nearby human had moved the food
rather than the chair. Our cat would then successfully per-
form it’s original plan and reach the table, only to find that
there was no food on the table. Although the plan suc-
ceeded, the goal of reaching food has not been achieved.
Seeking food involves the goal3
2Or a robot: www.necoro.com
3The notation Goal(s;P; f ) is read as “achieve condition s us-
ing the set of plans P; failing if f becomes true”.
Goal(atfood;findfood;nofood) where findfood is a
set of plans for locating food, planning a path
to reach the food, and following the path and
where atfood  9X :foodat(X) ^ location(X) and
nofood :9X :foodat(X).
The correct behaviour of the cat relies on goal execution
having certain desired properties. In the next section we
explore what these properties are and how the execution
mechanism for goals can be derived so that it possesses
these properties. In section 3 we present a plan notation
with goals and give its formal semantics. Section 4 dis-
cusses how interaction between goals (both positive and
negative - i.e. conflicts) can be reasoned about and man-
aged by using declarative information.
2 Representing Goals
What properties should goals have? In specifying a goal
construct this question is of obvious importance and we
shall begin by looking at desired properties of goals. Af-
ter identifying the desired properties of goals, we then de-
rive a procedural interpretation for goals which meets these
desired properties.
The BDI work of Rao and Georgeff (Rao and Georgeff,
1992) requires that successful and impossible attitudes are
dropped4 (that is, goals must not already be achieved and
they must be possible), that goals are known to the agent
(axiom AI5 (Rao and Georgeff, 1991; Rao and Georgeff,
1998)) and that the set of goals held by an agent be consis-
tent (Rao and Georgeff, 1992). Although persistence is left
up to the commitment strategy, rather than being a prop-
erty of the framework, the common commitment strategies
require persistency of goals.
The formalisation of (van Linder et al., 1995) defines goals
in terms of preferences. Preferences are persistent and
known. Goals are selected from those preferences which
are unfulfilled and realisable. Goals are also required to be
consistent, so that where GA denotes that A is a goal, we
have that (GA):G:A).
The GOAL language (Hindriks et al., 2001) requires that
goals not be entailed by beliefs (i.e. that they be un-
achieved) and that goals be satisfiable. The set of goals
G is not required to be consistent: G can contain both p
and :p. This is handled by not requiring that all goals be
achieved simultaneously, so that if G = fp;:pg then p can
be achieved and discharged and :p can be achieved at a
later time. A consequence of this is that the goal Ga^ b
is not implied by the two goals Ga and Gb (since a and
4The abstract BDI interpreter on page 441 includes
the steps drop-successful-attitudes(B,G,I) and drop-impossible-
attitudes(B,G,I) which correspond to an open minded commit-
ment strategy.
b could be achieved at different times). Further, the goal
operator does not distribute over implication.
Table 1: Properties of goals
BDI van Linder et al. GOAL
Drop successful 3 3 3
Drop impossible 3 3 3
Known 3 3
Consistent 3 3
Persistent ( 3 ) 3
We thus require goals held by a rational agent to be persis-
tent, unachieved, possible, consistent, and known:
Persistent: A goal should only be deleted when it suc-
ceeds or where there is a good reason for dropping
it. A rational agent should not drop its goals without a
good reason.
Unachieved: A goal to achieve s should be dropped when
s is true. Note that this focuses on the desired out-
come rather than the process - if we are in the middle
of executing a plan P in order to bring about s and s
becomes true, then the goal is dropped (with success)
and the plan P aborted. A corollary is that a goal to
achieve s where s already holds should trivially suc-
ceed without doing anything.
Possible: We specify a failure condition f which defines
when a goal should be dropped with failure. In the
same way that specifying s decouples the success of a
goal from the success of its plans, specifying f decou-
ples goal failure from plan failure. One advantage of
allowing f to be specified is that it allows for a range
of commitment strategies to be realised by specifying
appropriate conditions for a goal to be dropped. We
assume open minded commitment (Rao and Georgeff,
1992) as a default; in this case a goal is dropped with
failure when it becomes impossible to achieve, i.e. f
corresponds to an impossibility condition. We thus
describe this desired property (goals are dropped with
failure when f becomes true) as possible.
Consistent: A rational agent’s goals are required to be
consistent; an agent should not simultaneously pursue
goals that conflict. For example, if an agent has a goal
of eating the food on the table and another goal of eat-
ing food on the shelf at the same time, then the agent
should recognise the conflict and resolve it in favour
of the more important goal.
Known: Finally, a rational agent should know what goals
it has; that is, goals should be known. This is an es-
sential prerequisite to being able to reason about inter-
actions between goals (see section 4).
Based on these properties we propose the construct
Goal(s;P; f ) which is read as “achieve s using P; failing
if f becomes true” and which is viewed as being an ex-
ecutable statement in a plan language. Both s and f are
logical formulae over about the agent’s beliefs. We assume
that s and f are exclusive, in that there is no world state
S such that S j= s^ f . The procedural aspect, P, is a set of
guarded plans of the form5 LC1 : P1; : : : ;Cn : PnM where each
Ci is a condition and each Pi is a plan designed to achieve
s. If the condition Ci is true, then Pi may be executed; if
there is more than one executable plan (i.e. more than one
condition is true) than a non-deterministic choice is made
between them.
The guiding intuition is that given an initial state of the
world S0, pursuing a goal Goal(s;P; f ) will result in a (pos-
sibly infinite) sequence of states S = hS0;S1;S2; : : :i. Note
that this sequence of states, which includes environmental
changes, cannot be wholly determined by Goal(s;P; f ) and
S. However, it is clearly constrained by Goal(s;P; f ), and it
is the nature of those constraints that we elicit.
In particular, we are concerned with ensuring that this
sequence behaves appropriately with respect to s and f
(i.e. the declarative aspects of goals) and in particular that
the persistence, unachieved and possible properties are re-
flected this sequence. The precise relationship between
these states is discussed in more detail in Section 3 where
we give the operational semantics for goals.
We denote by exec(Goal(s;P; f );S) a sequence of states that
results from executing Goal(s;P; f ) in the state S. Note
that there can be more than one such sequence (as P may
contain a number of possible courses of action). However,
in such cases an implementation will have to select a par-
ticular course of action to follow, and the properties dis-
cussed in the remainder of this section are independent of
this choice.
Thus the persistent, unachieved and possible properties are
captured as the following properties of the sequence of
states:
 If there is a state Sn in S such that Sn j= s_ f , then
S = hS0;S1; : : :Sni (i.e. S is finite and Sn is the final
state in the sequence) and 8 0  i  n− 1 we have
Si 6j= s_ f .
 Otherwise, S is infinite (and hence 8i  0 we have
Si 6j= s_ f ).
The persistent property is captured by the sequence being
infinite unless there is a state in which s or f is true. The
unachieved and possible properties are captured by the re-
quirement that if there is such a state in the sequence, then
5More generally, P can be any construct of a plan-language.
it is the final such state and neither s nor f is true in any pre-
vious state. In other words, the execution of a goal stops if
(and only if!) either s or f become true.
The known condition corresponds to maintaining a data
structure containing a record of the goals held by the agent;
this is done in Section 3; consistency is discussed in Sec-
tion 4.
We now define exec. This provides the link between the
sequence discussed above and the plans P used to achieve
the goal. As discussed above, the desired behaviour of exec
is that if s or f hold in S then it should do nothing, other-
wise it executes P. There are now three cases: (i) s_ f
becomes true during the execution of P, (ii) s_ f is true
when P completes executing (but not before), and (iii) s_ f
remains false while P executes, and is false when P com-
pletes. In the first case, we abort the execution of P when
s_ f becomes true and return the result of partially exe-
cuting P (pexec); in the second case we return the result
of executing P. In the third case we cannot complete the
execution of Goal(s;P; f ) since neither s nor f are true; we
thus continue to execute Goal(s;P; f ) in the situation result-
ing from P’s execution.
Hence we denote by pexec(X ;Goal(s;P; f );S) the sequence
of states resulting from executing no further than the com-
pletion of P, but halting as soon as any condition in the
set X becomes true (formally, pexec(X ;P;S) is a prefix of
exec(P;S)); thus pexec(X ;Goal(s;P; f );S) has three possi-
ble cases:
 hS = S0;S1;S2; : : :Sni where Sn j= s _ f _
_
x2X
x and
8 0 i < n we have Si 6j= s_ f _
_
x2X
x
 hS = S0;S1;S2; : : :Smiwhere 8 0 im we have Si 6j=
s_ f __
x2X
x and P terminates in state Sm
 hS = S0;S1;S2; : : :i where 8 i 0 we have Si 6j= s_ f _
_
x2X
x
Note that in the third case, P does not terminate and there
is no state in which s_ f becomes true.
We then define exec(Goal(s;P; f )) as the result of repeat-
edly applying pexec(P) until one of s or f becomes true, as
below.
Definition 1 We say a sequence of states S is s; f -
compatible if either
 8Si 2 SSi 6j= s_ f
 S = hS0;S ¥ ; : : :Sni, Sn j= s_ f and 80  i n−1 we
have Si 6j= s_ f
We define pexec(Goal(s;P; f );S) as a maximal s; f -
compatible sequence of states that results from the execu-
tion of P commencing in state S.
We define exec(Goal(s;P; f );S) as
 hSi if S j= s_ f
 pexec(fs; fg;P;S) if pexec(fs; fg;P;S) j= s _ f or
pexec(fs; fg;P;S) is infinite
 pexec(fs; fg;P;S)  tl(exec(Goal(s;P; f );S0)) other-
wise, where S0 is the final state of pexec(fs; fg;P;S),
“” denotes sequence concatenation, and tl(−) is the
sequence without its first element; this is needed since
S0 is also the first state of exec(Goal(s;P; f );S0).
We say that the goal Goal(s;P; f ) succeeds from S if
exec(Goal(s;P; f );S) is finite and its final state Sn is such
that Sn j= s. We say that the goal Goal(s;P; f ) fails from S
if exec(Goal(s;P; f );S) is finite and its final state Sn is such
that Sn j= f .
It is then straightforward to show the following result.
Proposition 1 For any Si in exec(Goal(s;P; f );S) we have
that
 If Si 6j= s_ f then there is a successor state Si+1 in
exec(Goal(s;P; f );S)
 Otherwise Si is the final state in exec(Goal(s;P; f );S)
Thus the derived execution semantics for goals satisfies
the unachieved, possible (via f ), and persistent conditions.
The known condition is addressed in Section 3 and consis-
tency is discussed in Section 4.
3 Operational Semantics
We now present a detailed operational semantics for a
high-level plan language incorporating as first-class citi-
zens goals with both declarative and procedural aspects.
The CAN6 notation and its semantics clearly (and formally)
illustrate how a possible plan language could be imple-
mented. Our reason for doing this is that we intend that
the notion of goal developed be realisable in implemented
agent systems. The notation we present below is illustra-
tive of the plan languages of typical agent languages, both
6CAN = Conceptual Agent Notation
in the BDI tradition, and elsewhere. In particular, it is sim-
ilar to Rao’s AgentSpeak(L) (Rao, 1996) and to Kinny’s Y
(Kinny, 2001), both of which attempt to extract the essence
of a class of implemented BDI agent platforms.
3.1 The CAN Notation
An agent program (denoted by P ) consists of a collection
of plan clauses of the form7 e : c1  c2 : P where e is an
event, ci are context conditions (logical formulae over the
agent’s beliefs) which must be true in order for the plan to
applicable8, and P is the plan body.
Beliefs (b) are first order terms but could be orthogonally
extended to other logics. All that we assume are that we
have operations to check whether a condition follows from
a belief set (B j= c), to add a belief to a belief set (B[fbg),
and to delete a belief from a belief set (Bn fbg). Tradition-
ally, agent systems have implemented addition and dele-
tion of beliefs as literal addition and deletion from a set
of terms, however, there is no reason why belief revision
could not be applied. A condition is a logical formula over
belief terms:
C ::= b jC^C jC_C j :C j 9x:C
The plan body P is built up from the following constructs.
We have the basic constants true, f ail and ex(X) (excep-
tion), and the primitives act (an action not further speci-
fied), operations to add (+b) and delete (−b) beliefs, a test
for a condition (?c), and events9 !e. We also have a number
of compounds: sequencing (P1;P2), parallelism (P1kP2),
and goals (Goal(s;P; f )).
In addition to these compounds there are also a number of
auxilliary compound forms which are used internally when
assigning semantics to constructs: for example when an
event matches a set of guarded plans these are collected
into a set of guarded alternatives (LB : P; : : :M). The other
auxilliary compound form is a choice operator dual to se-
quencing (P1 .P2), which executes P1 and then executes P2
only if P1 failed. The language is described by the follow-
ing grammar:
P ::= true j f ail j ex(X)
j act j+b j −b j ?c j !e
j P;P j P k P j Goal(s;P; f )
j P. P j LB : P; : : : ;B : PM
7An omitted ci is equivalent to true.
8More precisely, c1 is an eager condition and c2 is lazy; both
must be true for the plan to be applied, but they are tested at dif-
ferent times: c1 is tested when the event is matched against the
plans, whereas c2 is tested when the plan is being considered for
execution.
9Where it is obvious that e is an event we shall sometimes
elide the exclamation mark, in the interests of readability.
3.2 Formal Semantics
We assume that we are given operations to check whether
a condition follows from a belief set (B j= c), to add a be-
lief to a belief set (B[ fbg), and to delete a belief from
a belief set (B n fbg). In the case of beliefs being a set
of ground atoms these operations are respectively conse-
quence checking, and set addition/deletion.
We define a basic configuration S = hB;G ;Pi where B is
the beliefs of the agent, G is a set of goals being pursued
(used for consistency checking – see section 4), and P is the
plan being executed. A transition S0 −! S1 specifies that
executing S0 a single step yields S1. We define S0 −! Sn
in the usual way: Sn is the result of one or more single step
transitions. The transition relation is defined using rules of
the form S−! S0 or of the form
S0 −! Sr
S −! S0r ; the latter are
conditional with the top (numerator) being the premise and
the bottom (denominator) being the conclusion. In order to
make the presentation more readable we use the convention
that where a component of S isn’t mentioned it is the same
in S and S0 (and in Sr and S0r). We also assume that B refers
to the agent’s beliefs, and elide angle brackets. Thus each
of the left rules is shorthand for the corresponding right
rule. The full set of rules are given in figure 1.
B j= c
?c−! true ?c
B j= c
hB;G ;?ci −! hB;G ;truei ?c
P1 −! P0
P1;P2 −! P0;P2
;
hB;G ;P1i −! hB0;G 0;P0i
hB;G ;P1;P2i −! hB0;G 0;P0;P2i
;
The first rule above specifies that the condition test ?c tran-
sitions to true if the condition c is a consequence of the
agent’s beliefs (B j= c). The second rule specifies that P1;P2
transitions to P0;P2 where P0 is the result of a single execu-
tion step of P1.
The operational semantics carry around a set of conditions
being watched for (−!X ). This is used by goals to interrupt
the execution of a sub-plan should a condition become true.
In order for this to work correctly we require that the check
rule take precedence over other rules – it must be applied
if it is applicable. We add rules to propagate exceptions,
interrupting further processing (;x, kx1, kx2, .x, and Gxi).
The rules for executing goals are based on the definitions
of exec and pexec. The rules G and Gcopy add s and f to the
conditions being watched for (X) and execute P. This relies
on the check rule to stop executing if s or f hold, throwing
an exception ex(x) when this occurs. The exception is han-
dled appropriately by one of the three Gxi rules. The rule
Gt f continues attempting to achieve the goal in the case that
executing P did not lead to s or f becoming true.
We extend simple configurations (which correspond to a
single thread of execution within an agent) to agent con-
figurations SA = hN;B;G;PPi which consist of a name, a
single (shared) belief set, a goal set, and a set of executing
plans. The following rule defines the operational seman-
tics over agent configurations in terms of the operational
semantics over simple configurations.
P 2 G hB;G;Pi −! hB0;G0;P0i
hN;B;G; G i −! hN;B0;G0;(G n fPg)[fP0gi Agent
Note that there are elements of nondeterminism in CAN,
such as the choice of plan to execute from a set of (mul-
tiple) applicable plans. In addition, the Agent rule nonde-
terministically selects an executing plan. In general, this
choice should be constrained by the desired scheduling pol-
icy (such as a round-robin strategy to ensure fairness of
some description).
One of the fundamental features of CAN is that it is a high-
level plan language, in the spirit of process algebras such
as the p -calculus and agent systems such as Y , rather than
a programming language per se. This means that we can
concentrate on the important issues, such as plan selection,
event handing, belief updates, etc. rather than potentially
cumbersome details such as data structures and mecha-
nisms for passing data around. As a result, CAN is agnostic
with respect to such issues.
Proposition 2 Let S(0) be approximated by B(0) (i.e.
S j= c iff B j= c) and let Q 2 ftrue; f ailg and
R 2 ftrue; f ail;ex(x)g. Then exec(P;S) = h: : : ;S0i iff
hB;G ;Pi −! hB0;G 0;Qi and pexec(X ;P;S) = h: : : ;S0i iff
hB;G ;Pi−!X hB0;G 0;Ri.
Proposition 3 Let S(0) be approximated by B(0). The goal
G succeeds (resp. fails) from state S iff hB;G ;Gi −!
hB0;G 0;truei (resp. if hB;G ;Gi −! hB0;G 0; f aili).
These rules specify a precise and implementable opera-
tional semantics for a plan language including goals with
both declarative and procedural aspects. The semantics
of goal execution respect the desired properties of goals
(namely persistent, unachieved, possible, and known; con-
sistency is discussed in the next section). These rules have
been translated into Prolog, yielding a prototype CAN in-
terpreter.
3.3 An Example
Let us return to the cat example given in section 1. A set of
plans suitable for sating hunger are given in figure 2. These
plans include explicitly human intervention, as described
in section 1.
We assume the following10:
G = Goal(atfood; !findfood;nofood)
a f = f oodat(X)^ location(X)
n f = not( f oodat(X))
P = findfood
G1 = GoalP(atfood;L!survey terrain;reach f oodM;
nofood)
r f = planpath(Y;X);?path(A); f ollowpath
G2 = GoalP(atfood; !survey terrain;reach f ood . LM;
nofood)
G3 = GoalP(atfood;true;reach f ood . LM;nofood)
G4 = GoalP(atfood;reach f ood . LM;nofood)
G0 = Goal(atfood;nofood)
X = fatfood;nofoodg
B0 = flocation( f loor);can jump( f loor;chair);
can jump(chair;table);can jump(ledge;table);
can jump(chair; ledge)g
B1 = flocation( f loor); f oodat(table);
can jump( f loor;chair);can jump(chair; ledge);
can jump(chair;table);can jump(ledge;table)g
We consider the cat seeking food, i.e. executing the goal
G. Note that the execution consists of multiple derivations,
each advancing the agent a single execution step. The first
step unfolds the goal, adding it to the goal set and not-
ing that nofood and atfood are conditions that need to be
watched, then posts the event findfood which matches a
single plan which first surveys the terrain then (attempts
to) reach food.
B0 j= f oodat(table)^ location( f loor)
B0;fG0g; !findfood−!X B0;fG0g;Lt :!st; !r f M Ev
B0;fG0g;GP −! /0 B0;fG0g;G1 G
B0; /0;G−! /0 B0;fG0g;G1
Gcopy
The second step selects the (only) plan.
B0 j= true
B0;fG0g;Lt :!st; !r f M−!X B0;fG0g; !st; !r f . LM Sel
B0;fG0g;G1 −! /0 B0;fG0g;G2 G
The third step performs the first step of the plan, namely
surveying the terrain11. We assume that this succeeds and
10Due to space limitations we use the following abbreviations;
st: survey terrain, rf: reachfood, nf: nofood, af: atfood, t: true, f:
fail.
11We have compressed matching the event against a plan, se-
lecting that plan, and executing it into a single step.
B j= c
?c−! true ?ct
B 6j= c
?c−! f ail ?c f B;+b−! B[fbg;true +b B;−b−! Bn fbg;true −b
a−! true act
B j= x 2 X
P−!X ex(x) check
(ti:ci bi:Pi) 2 P B j= ci
!e−! Lb1:P1; : : : ;bn:PnM Ev
:9bi:Pi 2 D :B j= bi
LD M−! f ail Sel f
bi:Pi 2 D B j= bi
L D M−! Pi . LD n fbi:PigM Sel
P1 −! P0
P1;P2 −! P0;P2
;
true;P−! P ;t f ail;P−! f ail ; f ex(X);P−! ex(X) ;x
P1 −! P0
P1kP2 −! P0kP2 k1
P2 −! P0
P1kP2 −! P1kP0 k2 truekP−! P kt1 Pktrue−! P kt2
f ailkP−! f ail k f 1 Pk f ail −! f ail k f 2 ex(X)kP−! ex(X) kx1 Pkex(X)−! ex(X) kx2
P1 −! P0
P1 . P2 −! P0 . P2
.
true. P−! true .t f ail . P−! P . f ex(X). P−! ex(X) .x
G[fGoal(s; f )g;GoalP(s;P; f )−!G0;P0
G;Goal(s;P; f ) −!G0;P0 Gcopy
P−!X[fs; fg P0
GoalP(s;P; f ) −!X GoalP(s;P0; f ) G
Q 2 f f ail;trueg
GoalP(s;Q; f ) −! GoalP(s;P; f )
Gt f G;GoalP(s;ex(s); f ) −! Gn fGoal(s; f )g;true Gx1
G;GoalP(s;ex( f ); f ) −! Gn fGoal(s; f )g; f ail Gx2
y 62 fs; fg
G;GoalP(s;ex(y); f ) −! Gn fGoal(s; f )g;ex(y) Gx3
P 2 G hB;G;Pi −! hB0;G0;P0i
hN;B;G; G i −! hN;B0;G0;(G n fPg)[fP0gi Agent
Note that in rules such as act we assume that actions always succeed. In order to take potential failures into account, it
is not difficult to modify such rules to explicitly check a given success (or failure) condition. Note also that the Ev rule
does not allow for multiple solutions of context conditions, modifying it to allow for multiple solutions is straightforward.
Likewise, adding explicit substitutions is not hard.
Figure 1: Operational Semantics
human intervention -canjump(chair,table) ; +canjump(chair,ledge).
becomehungry +hungry ; goal(not(hungry), satehunger, fail).
satehunger reachfood ; eatfood.
eatfood : foodat(X) ^ location(X) act(eatfood) ; -foodat(X) ; sated.
sated : hungry -hungry.
sated true.
reachfood goal(foodat(X) ^ location(X),findfood, not(foodat(X))).
findfood : foodat(X) ^ location(Y) survey terrain ; planpath(Y,X) ; ?path(A) ; followpath.
survey terrain act(survey terrain).
planpath(X,Y): plan(P) -plan(P) ; planpath(X,Y).
planpath(X,Y): canjump(X,Y) +path([X,Y]).
planpath(X,Y): canjump(Y,X) +path([X,Y]).
planpath(X,Y): canjump(X,Z) ^ canjump(Z,Y) +path([X,Z,Y]).
planpath(X,Y): canjump(X,Z) ^ canjump(Z,Q) ^ canjump(Q,Y) +path([X,Z,Q,Y]).
followpath: path([P1]) -path([P1]).
followpath: path([P1,P2jPs]) jump(P1,P2) ; -path([P1,P2jPs]) ; +path([P2jPs]) ; followpath.
jump(floor,chair): location(floor) ^ canjump(floor,chair)
 act(jump(floor,chair)) ; -location(floor) ; +location(chair) ; human intervention.
jump(P1,P2): location(P1) ^ (canjump(P1,P2) _ canjump(P2,P1)) act(jump(P1,P2)) ; -location(P1) ; +location(P2).
Figure 2: Sample Plans for the Cat
updates the agent’s beliefs from B0 to B1.
.
.
.
.
B0;fG0g; !st −!X B1;fG0g;t
B0;fG0g; !st; !r f −!X B1;fG0g;t; !r f
;
B0;fG0g; !st; !r f . LM−!X B1;fG0g; !st; !r f . LM .
B0;fG0g;G2 −! /0 B1;fG0g;G3 G
The fourth step simply removes the true.
B1;fG0g;t; !r f −!X B1;fG0g; !r f
;t
B1;fG0g;t; !r f . LM−!X B1;fG0g; !r f . LM .
B1;fG0g;G3 −! /0 B1;fG0g;G4 G
The execution continues by:
 planning a path from the floor to the table (via the
chair),
 jumping onto the chair
 having the human move the chair
 realising that the next step in the plan (jumping from
the chair to the table) cannot be done
 surveying the terrain
 planning a path from the chair to the table (via the
ledge)
 jumping to the ledge, jumping to the table, and then
eating12.
12In this run there isn’t any food on the ledge
4 Reasoning about Goals
When an agent has more than one goal to pursue, there
are a number of ways in which the pursuit of these goals
can fail to be independent. At one extreme an agent has
as goals both A and :A, here it is clearly irrational for the
agent to attempt to satisfy both goals (or at least both goals
simultaneously). It is also possible for goals to be logically
consistent but not simultaneously achievable (for example
they might require the same resources). A third possibil-
ity is that only some of the plans for each goal conflict,
and hence it is possible to achieve both goals simultane-
ously by an appropriate choice of plan. For example, con-
sider a goal to eat food (and there is food on the table and
on a shelf) and a goal to scratch the table (an obviously
naughty cat). These two goals can be simultaneously pur-
sued and achieved (e.g. jumping onto the table and eating
the food on it while scratching it), but some choice of plan
(e.g. planning to eat the food on the shelf) will create a con-
flict between the goals13. In some instances it may also be
appropriate to show that pursuit of a given set of goals can
be achieved independently of each other — in other words,
that there is no interference at all, and hence the plans to
achieve each goal can be freely interleaved. Finally, we
may wish to determine instances of positive interference,
i.e. situations in which the achievement of one goal can
13Of course, it is possible that all plans to achieve the goals
conflict. We are currently working on solutions to such instances
by identifying such conflicts via summary information based on
the work of Clement and Durfee (Clement and Durfee, 1999b;
Clement and Durfee, 1999a).
assist in the achievement of other goals.
In this section we discuss various possibilities for perform-
ing these kinds of reasoning in our framework. For space
reasons, this will necessarily be illustrative of the possibil-
ities rather than a detailed prescription.
Our framework for goals simplifies the development of this
kind of reasoning, such as being able to identify sub-goals
sgn(G) which necessarily appear in the pursuit of G and
sub-goals sgp(G) which possibly so appear. The definition
for sgn(G) is thus
sgn(P1;P2) = sgn(P1)[ sgn(P2)
sgn(LB1 : P1; : : : ;Bn : PnM) =
\
1in
sgn(Pi)
sgn(Goal(s;P; f )) = fGoal(s;P; f )g[ sgn(P)
sgn(a) = /0
and similarly for sgp(G) with
T
replaced with
S
. Note
that sgn(G) sgp(G).
In general an agent will have a set of goals G and it wants
to ensure that the addition of a given goal G does not con-
flict with G . We say that G and G = fG1; : : : ;Gng are
necessarily consistent iff all possible subgoals of G and
all possible subgoals of all Gi in G do not conflict, i.e.
8g2 sgp(G):8Gi 2G :8gi 2 sgp(Gi):g\gi, where G1\G2 in-
dicates that the s and f conditions for G1 and G2 are com-
patible14. Similarly, we say that G and G = fG1; : : : ;Gng
are necessarily inconsistent iff some necessary subgoal of
G and some necessary subgoal of any Gi in G conflict, i.e.
9g 2 sgn(G):9Gi 2 G :9gi 2 sgn(Gi)::(g\gi).
The definition of necessarily (in)consistent only considers
goal compatibility in detecting conflict between a new goal
G and the existing set of goals G . However, we also need
to consider the resource requirements of goals and ensure
that there are no conflicts with respect to the resource re-
quirements of G and that of G .
We can define notions of necessary and possible resources
as we did for sub-goals, but there are some differences in
the way we deal with goal compatibility and resource com-
patibility. In goal compatibility we compare each sub-goal
of G with every sub-goal of every goal Gn in G and this
is sufficient. However this would not suffice for resource
compatibility. For example assume that there are 50 units
of the resource energy available, G requires 20 units of
energy, and Gn has two necessary sub-goals SG1 and SG2
that require 25 units of energy each. G is compatible with
SG1 and SG2 individually (since 20+25 50) but not with
Gn because Gn requires the combined resources of SG1 and
SG2 (i.e. 20 +(25 + 25)  50). Therefore it is necessary
to combine the resource requirements of the sub-goals of a
goal in order to check for resource compatibility.
14For example, that achieving one goal does not cause the other
goal to fail.
In order to combine resource summaries we need to iden-
tify the different types of resources. Similar to sub-goals re-
sources can also be classified as either necessary resources
or possible resources. Some resources are no longer avail-
able after use (consumable resources, e.g. food), whilst
others are still available after use (reusable resources, e.g.
chair). The manner in which we derive resources sum-
maries for a goal depends on the classification of the re-
source and the way in which the sub-goals are combined
(i.e. whether they are sequential sub-goals or parallel sub-
goals). Due to space limitation we cannot provide for-
mal definitions and algorithms for deriving and using re-
source requirement summaries for goals, however we have
addressed them in other work (Thangarajah et al., 2002b)
which we will discuss in section 5.
If G and G are neither necessarily consistent nor neces-
sarily inconsistent then they are possibly consistent (or, for
that matter, possibly inconsistent). In the case where two
goals are necessarily consistent we can achieve them con-
currently. If they are necessarily inconsistent then we need
to choose between them (Thangarajah et al., 2002a). If they
are possibly inconsistent then we need to choose consistent
means of achieving these goals.
Our framework also provides a suitable foundation for rea-
soning about positively interacting goals. We say that two
goals G1 and G2 necessarily support each other if there is
common necessary subgoal, i.e. sgn(G1)\ sgn(G2) 6= /0.
For example, driving to the beach and driving to the garage
might both have the necessary subgoal of getting more
petrol (“Gas” in American English). However, this re-
quires that any plans chosen must generate the same single
sub-goal, which appears to be too strong, where it seems
more natural to require that for any plan choice, a common
sub-goal, possibly depending on the plan choice made, can
be made to arise. We thus define a weaker condition and
say that two goals G1 and G2 possibly support each other
(G1
G2) if they either necessarily support each other or if
(i) given a choice of Pi from the set of plans fP1; : : : ;Png as-
sociated with G1 there exists a choice of Qj from the set of
plans fQ1; : : : ;Qmg associated with G2, such that Pi
 Q j;
and (ii) given a choice of Q j there exists a choice of Pi such
that Pi
 Q j.
Note that it is entirely possible for both positive and nega-
tive interactions to occur simultaneously. Consider the fol-
lowing example (based on (Horty and Pollack, 2001)): we
need to travel to the airport to catch a 4pm flight and are
considering catching either a taxi (expensive but faster) or
a bus (cheaper but slower). We need to decide whether to
adopt the goal of attending a meeting at 2:30pm. Assum-
ing the meeting is likely to run late and is being held at
the university this would constrain us to catch a taxi and
thus attending the meeting is seen as less desirable in con-
text. If the meeting were to be held at 3:30 at the university
then it would prevent us from reaching the airport in time,
which makes attending the meeting impossible (assuming
the flight is more important than the meeting). On the other
hand, if the meeting were held at the airport, then, since we
are already intending to travel to the airport, the cost of at-
tending the meeting is lower than it would be, and hence in
this context, the meeting is seen as possible and desirable.
This example illustrates the sorts of reasoning that we want
to be able to perform, namely assessing how goals can both
hinder and help other goals.
5 Discussion
We have proposed an explicit goal construct for agent sys-
tems, based on the desired (declarative) properties of goals,
and we have given an operational interpretation, via the
rules of Section 3, which realises these properties. We have
also discussed how reasoning about interactions between
goals, both positive and negative, can be performed within
our goal framework. We anticipate that this work will form
the basis of significant development of agent systems with
explicit representation of goals, including those based on
the popular BDI model, thus reducing the gap between the-
ory and practice, and enhancing the intelligent capabilities
of such systems.
Due to space limitations we did not provide details on how
to derive resource summaries and the details of how they
can be used to detect conflict between goals with respect
to resource requirements. We have however addressed this
in (Thangarajah et al., 2002b). In that work we charac-
terise different types of resources and define resource re-
quirements summaries. We give algorithms for deriving
resource requirements, using resource requirements to de-
tect conflict, and performing dynamic updates of resource
requirements; we also discuss how conflict can be resolved.
Although the operational behaviour of goals can be realised
in BDI systems (using maintenance conditions), we be-
lieve that goals are a sufficiently key concept for intelligent
agents that they deserve to be represented directly. Further-
more, the declarative aspects are important and by repre-
senting goals we enable reasoning about interactions (both
positive and negative) to be done.
5.1 Related Work
AgentSpeak (Rao, 1996) and Y (Kinny, 2001) both cap-
ture in a formal way the semantics of a plan language in-
terpreter. They focus on capturing the essence of current
practice and as a result capture the weaknesses of (current)
BDI systems including the lack of declarative goals and as-
sociated problems.
The GOAL language (Hindriks et al., 2001) uses declara-
tive goals but lacks a sufficiently powerful notion of proce-
dural goals: plans cannot use sequences and are limited to
being reactive.
Horty and Pollack (Horty and Pollack, 2001) formalise the
reasoning process for positively interacting (i.e. assisting)
goals by defining a notion of compatible plans and of the
merging of (compatible) plans. The cost of a plan P in con-
text C (where the two are compatible) is the difference be-
tween the cost of the context merged with the plan and the
cost of the context on its own: k (P=C ) = k (P [C )− k (C ).
Their work only addresses positive interactions and as-
sumes that plans can be (at least roughly) simulated and
that the cost of executing a plan can be at least approx-
imated15. By comparison, we reason directly about con-
flicts between goals and address both negative and positive
interactions.
There is a considerable amount of work on conflict in agent
systems which addresses many different types of conflicts
at various levels (see for example (Tessier et al., 2000)).
By contrast, the main contribution of this paper isn’t ways
of dealing with conflict, but rather a realisation of goals
in BDI-like systems. This realisation provides an imple-
mentable foundation upon which conflict resolution can be
built, and alternative approaches compared.
5.2 Future Work
There is a wide range of directions for future work includ-
ing: reasoning about plans; looking at attaching declar-
ative information to program elements other than goals
(in particular to plans); investigating the use of other
forms of declarative assertions in addition to postconditions
(e.g. preconditions, in-conditions (Clement and Durfee,
1999b; Clement and Durfee, 1999a)); investigating how
Goal(s;P; f ) allows for the derivation of potential plans P0
from s (and f ) should the given plan P fail in achieving s;
extending to richer forms of goals including temporal logic
and resources; and investigating the use of declarative as-
pects of goals in debugging agent systems.
We have addressed the issue of dealing with resource re-
quirements in detecting conflicts between goals. Future
work includes extending this concept to handle positive in-
teraction (co-operation) between goals with respect to re-
source requirements (e.g. there is a positive interaction be-
tween two goals if one goal renews a consumable resource
that is necessary for the other goal).
15For practical reasons they do not compute the precise cost,
but rather maintain an approximation interval which contains the
true cost. In some cases decisions can be made based on the in-
terval without having to know the precise cost.
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